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This paper studies the Great Inﬂation in Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. Newspaper coverage and poli-
cymakers’ statements are used to analyze the views on the
inﬂation process that led to the 1970s macroeconomic poli-
cies, and the diﬀerent movement in each country away from
1970s views. I argue that to understand the course of policy in
each country, it is crucial to use the monetary policy neglect
hypothesis, which claims that the Great Inﬂation occurred be-
cause policymakers delegated inﬂation control to nonmonetary
devices. This hypothesis helps explain why, unlike Canada,
Australia and New Zealand continued to suﬀer high inﬂation
in the mid-1980s. The delayed disinﬂation in these countries
reﬂected the continuing importance accorded to nonmonetary
views of inﬂation.
JEL Codes: E31, E52, E58, E64
Christiano and Gust (2000, 21) observe that the Great Inﬂation
of the 1970s took place in many countries and note the desirability
of “understanding why it happened and what can be done to prevent
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it happening again.” In practice, however, examination of the U.S.
experience has dominated the literature on the Great Inﬂation. This
paper instead looks at three other countries that experienced the
Great Inﬂation: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The record of
these countries has been useful in studying the international expe-
rience with inﬂation targeting (Bernanke et al. 1999; Debelle 1996)
and earlier developments in these countries can be useful in discrim-
inating between diﬀerent explanations for the Great Inﬂation.
As discussed below, several diﬀerent hypotheses have been ad-
vanced in the literature on the Great Inﬂation to explain the over-
expansionary monetary policy of the 1970s. While diﬀering in de-
tail, most of the diﬀerent explanations—such as those emphasizing
inﬂation bias by policymakers (e.g., Ireland 1999) or attempts to ex-
ploit Phillips curve trade-oﬀs (e.g., Sargent 1999)—take for granted
that the monetary authorities understand that their own actions, by
expanding or contracting aggregate demand, have a decisive eﬀect
on the inﬂation rate. By contrast, the prevalent features of policy-
makers’ statements in the United States (Romer and Romer 2002;
Nelson 2004) and the United Kingdom (Nelson and Nikolov 2004)
are the use of special-factors or “cost-push” explanations of inﬂation
behavior and the promotion of nonmonetary devices (such as wage
and price controls) as the means of controlling inﬂation. In light
of this, Nelson and Nikolov (2004) argue that the monetary policy
neglect hypothesis explains the Great Inﬂation: policymakers had a
misguided view of the nature of inﬂation, and the Great Inﬂation oc-
curred because inﬂation control was delegated to instruments other
than monetary policy.
This paper presents further evidence for the monetary policy ne-
glect hypothesis by showing that it accounts for policy developments
during the Great Inﬂation in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
I examine policymakers’ statements and the record of their actions
during the Great Inﬂation to draw out their views on the forces
driving inﬂation. For the United States, Romer and Romer (2002)
obtained information of this kind from Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) minutes. No strictly comparable material exists for
the three countries studied here, largely because their central banks
were not independent during the 1970s. Instead, I document policy-
makers’ views by examining newspaper reports as well as speeches
of senior government ﬁgures. In addition to supporting the neglect
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hypothesis, this material helps rule out several other hypotheses that
have been advanced to explain the Great Inﬂation.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 gives an overview of the
Great Inﬂation in each country. Section 2 outlines the monetary pol-
icy neglect hypothesis and discusses several alternative hypotheses.
Sections 3–5 examine the policy record during the Great Inﬂation in
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Section 6 concludes.
1. An Overview of the Great Inﬂation
Figures 1–3 plot four-quarter consumer price index inﬂation for
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The increase in Canada’s in-
ﬂation rate from its 1960s values to its 1981 peak is interrupted by
declines in 1970–71 and after 1975. Only the ﬁrst of these declines,
Figure 1. Four-Quarter CPI Inﬂation: Canada
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Figure 2. Four-Quarter CPI Inﬂation: Australia
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Figure 3. Four-Quarter CPI Inﬂation: New Zealand
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however, is genuine, as the second period was characterized by com-
pulsory price controls (see section 3). Inﬂation shifts decisively to
single digits in late 1982. Australia also has lower inﬂation in the
1980s than the 1970s, but the improvement is marred by rebounds
in 1985–86 and 1988–90, and in no quarter over 1973–90 does the
rate fall below 5 percent. New Zealand inﬂation performance is poor
in both the 1970s and 1980s; the temporary improvement in inﬂa-
tion over 1982–84 is wholly artiﬁcial, reﬂecting the imposition of a
wage-price freeze over that period (see section 5).
Figures 4–6 compare actual short-term interest-rate choices with
prescriptions for each year from a Taylor (1993) rule.1 In these charts,
the target inﬂation rate is 2.5 percent and the steady-state real
rate has been imposed at 4 percent (3 percent for Canada). These
diﬀer from the choice of 2 percent for both in Taylor (1993), but
are justiﬁed by the diﬀerent experience of these countries from the
United States. The imposed 2.5 percent inﬂation target lies inside
the target ranges currently being pursued in all three countries and,
as discussed below, also corresponds to the concept of price stabil-
ity prevailing among Australian and Canadian policymakers in the
1970s. Real interest rates in Australia and New Zealand have aver-
aged above 3 percent under inﬂation targeting and have also tended
to be higher than in the United States or Canada. This suggests
that their average real rate compatible with price stability is at least
1The interest rate for Canada and Australia is the nominal Treasury bill rate;
for New Zealand, it is the nominal short-term rate series of Orden and Fisher
(1993).
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Figure 4. Short-Term Interest Rate and Taylor Rule
Prescriptions: Canada
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Figure 5. Short-Term Interest Rate and Taylor Rule
Prescriptions: Australia
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Figure 6. Short-Term Interest Rate and Taylor Rule
Prescriptions: New Zealand
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3 percent, while the global fall in real rates in the 1990s suggests
that a still higher steady-state real rate should be assumed for the
period studied here.
The Great Inﬂation in each country tends to correspond with
large deviations from the Taylor rule prescription. One caveat is that
the reliability of the rule prescriptions depends on the quality of the
data used as inputs. Just as price controls in New Zealand artiﬁcially
suppressed inﬂation over 1982–84, the use of the distorted inﬂation
data in the Taylor rule produces a spurious dip in the interest-rate
prescriptions.
A related caveat about data quality is that the rule prescriptions
in ﬁgures 4–6 use detrended output computed from ﬁnal data. As
Orphanides (2003) shows for the United States, such revised esti-
mates may diﬀer substantially from policymakers’ perception in real
time of the position of output relative to potential. Figures 7–9 plot
detrended output for the 1970s for each country, using ﬁnal data,2
against estimates of the output gap during the 1970s. For Australia
and Canada, historical estimates of the output gap were reported
by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) (1973). The 1977 Canadian output gap in ﬁgure 7 is an
approximation of the series used in McCracken et al. (1977).3 For
Australia and New Zealand, the 1977 gap is obtained by detrending
the log of the 1977 IFS 4 vintage of real gross domestic product
(GDP) data, with the trend estimated on annual data for 1957–73.
2Final data on detrended output in ﬁgures 7–9 are linear-detrended annual
GDP data, also used in ﬁgures 4–6. The linear trends assume breaks in 1974 (as
well as 1995 for Canada and Australia). As ﬁgure 7 shows, for Canada, the result-
ing series has the implausible property of being negative virtually throughout the
1970s. An alternative (quadratic) detrending method instead yields a series that
is positive throughout the 1970s. The high inﬂation and money growth outcomes
in Canada suggest that the actual output gap was generally positive rather than
negative.
3This approximation is obtained ﬁrst by using the annual data on real GDP
for Canada in IFS (June 1977). A potential GDP series for Canada, designed to
match that used by McCracken et al., was then deduced from the information
given in McCracken et al. (1977, 319) and Laidler (1978), i.e., 5 percent annual
growth in potential output, and only one year (1973) in the 1970s during which
output exceeded potential.
4Articles from newspapers and other periodicals are cited in the text by their
acronym and date. Acronyms are given in appendix 1, while a bibliographical
appendix (appendix 2) gives full details for each article.
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Figure 7. Output Gap Estimates: Canada
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Figure 8. Output Gap Estimates: Australia
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Table 1. Average Annual Output Growth Rates∗
Canada Australia New Zealand
1962–1973 1974–1993 1961–1973 1974–1993 1961–1973 1974–1993
5.3 2.7 4.8 2.8 4.9 1.0
*For Canada and Australia, output is deﬁned as real GDP; for New
Zealand, output is deﬁned as nominal GDP divided by the CPI.
This is intended as an approximation of how policymakers in 1977
estimated potential GDP.5
Comparison of these 1973 estimates with today’s estimates of
detrended output suggests that the initial numbers overstated the
weakness of demand in the early 1970s. In addition, like the United
States, the three countries studied here experienced slower growth in
output after 1973 (table 1). The detrended output series plotted in
ﬁgures 7–9 take this break in trend into account, but gap estimates
up to 1977 did not. As a result, the 1977 gap estimates reported
in ﬁgures 7–9 are far more negative in the late 1970s than the ﬁnal
estimates of output relative to trend. As we will see below, the nature
of these errors did much to move policymakers away from orthodox
approaches to analyzing inﬂation.
2. The Monetary Policy Neglect Hypothesis
Using the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, the behavior of
inﬂation may be written
πt = b1 + b2 EtΣi =0∞ b3i(yt+i – yt+i∗) + b4(ut – E[ut]) (1)
where πt is inﬂation, yt is log output, yt* is log potential output, ut
is an exogenous disturbance, and the bi are positive coeﬃcients with
b3 near unity. As in Nelson (2004), the alternative views of inﬂation
in 1970s debates—monetary versus nonmonetary—may be expressed
as restrictions on equation (1).
A nonmonetary explanation of inﬂation attributes the 1970s in-
ﬂation to persistent movements in the ut term in equation (1)—often
5The post-1973 slowdown in potential was not noted oﬃcially in New Zealand
until 1978 (see section 5). Recognition was slow too in Australia, with Nevile’s
(1981, 50) assumed lower bound on post-1973 potential growth being 4.1 percent.
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termed “cost-push” ﬂuctuations—as well as to shifts in the mean of
the ut process (which thus produced shifts in the constant term, b1).
This explanation contends that excess demand did not matter for
inﬂation, as it maintains that the coeﬃcient b2 goes to zero when
the output gap (yt – yt*) is negative. Therefore, according to this
explanation, output falling below potential does not produce any
downward pressure on inﬂation. Exponents of the nonmonetary ex-
planation of inﬂation in the 1970s frequently conceded that a role
for excess demand factors in driving inﬂation arises when output is
above potential,6 but this was a minor qualiﬁcation, as they believed
that the output gap was rarely positive during the 1970s.
A monetary explanation of inﬂation, on the other hand, contends
that b2 is well above zero for all values of the output gap, and that
the shifts in inﬂation during the 1970s are attributable to excessive
aggregate demand (protracted periods of positive output gaps) cre-
ated by the monetary authorities. The explanation concedes a role
for the ut term in equation (1) in producing one-time movements in
the price level, but not sustained movements in inﬂation. Together
with b2 > 0, the monetary explanation therefore imposes the restric-
tions that yt is interest-elastic (so excessive aggregate demand can be
prevented by monetary policy), and that ut has a zero mean (imply-
ing that E[ut] does not enter the expression for b1) and is white noise
(so only excess demand and the constant term enter the expression
for expected future inﬂation).7
The monetary policy neglect hypothesis claims that the monetary
explanation is the correct one, but that policymakers in the 1970s
subscribed to the nonmonetary explanation. They therefore relied
on wage and price controls, rather than monetary policy, to control
inﬂation.
The hypothesis thus has two components: about inﬂation (the
validity of the monetary view) and about policy behavior (the claim
that policymakers embraced a nonmonetary view of inﬂation). In
section 2.1 below, I consider the applicability of the monetary view
of inﬂation to the three countries studied here. Before that, it is useful
to discuss several alternative hypotheses about policy behavior in the
Great Inﬂation and why they do not ﬁt the facts for these countries.
6That is, they subscribed to an asymmetric version of (1), where b2 turns
positive only when the output gap is positive.
7The white-noise restriction additionally implies b4 = 1 in equation (1).
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2.1 Consciously Inﬂationary Policies
One class of explanations for the Great Inﬂation attributes to policy-
makers a conscious choice of inﬂationary policies. For example, the
time-consistency explanation, pursued for the 1970s inﬂation by Ire-
land (1999), postulates that policymakers had an objective of a pos-
itive output gap. While rejecting the time-consistency story, DeLong
(1997) argues that political pressures made it necessary to set un-
employment targets below the natural rate. But as we will see, poli-
cymakers in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand repeatedly stated
their output goal as potential, not some level beyond their estimate
of potential. This goal also featured in their internal discussions:
for example, a Treasury submission to cabinet in Australia in 1973
stated that “the capacity of supply” should govern policy on demand
management (ACR, October 5, 1973).
Nor does these countries’ experience suggest a conscious targeting
of high inﬂation rates, either because of feared costs of low-inﬂation
equilibria (as in Christiano and Gust 2000) or low estimates of the
cost of high inﬂation. Inﬂation was regarded as costly—for example,
Prime Minister Whitlam of Australia said in 1974, “Let me be frank:
inﬂation costs jobs” (TA, October 22, 1974)—and the authorities’
recourse to wage or price controls in each country was a drastic
(though misguided) attempt to escape high inﬂation. The concept of
price stability seems to have been similar to that in the later inﬂation
targeting period: for example, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau said
in 1970 that “inﬂation no longer exists in Canada” when the four-
quarter rate fell into the 2–3 percent range (TST, December 24,
1970), while the Australian Treasury in 1973 characterized the costs
of inﬂation as occurring when inﬂation rose above the 3 percent
barrier (ACR, October 5, 1973).
2.2 Convergence to a Vertical Phillips Curve Model
Sargent (1999) characterizes policymakers as entering the Great
Inﬂation with a nonvertical long-run Phillips curve model and as
converging to a vertical model as they observed the stagﬂation of
the 1970s. This account does not describe either the initial condi-
tions or the learning process in the three countries studied here.
As of 1970, none had a nonvertical Phillips curve guiding policy;
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rather, Canada’s authorities actually subscribed to a long-run ver-
tical Phillips curve, while the other two countries had a cost-push
view of inﬂation. Moreover, in all three countries, the 1970s out-
comes convinced the authorities of the validity of the cost-push view
of inﬂation, rather than moving them to a more orthodox framework.
The reason is that the Sargent story requires policymakers to observe
that the output gap returns to zero despite larger doses of inﬂation,
whereas 1970s policymakers thought they observed combinations of
sustained high inﬂation and large negative output gaps. The cost-
push view of inﬂation was therefore appealing because it rationalized
arbitrary inﬂation/output gap combinations. Consequently, support
for the conventional approach to inﬂation collapsed in Canada, while
in Australia and New Zealand, support for the cost-push view of
inﬂation hardened. For example, Prime Minister Muldoon of New
Zealand said in 1977, “In this economy, unemployment and inﬂation
are not related; I’m convinced of that” (EP, October 14, 1977), oﬀer-
ing this as the basis for why his expansion of demand would not stim-
ulate inﬂation, while former Prime Minister Whitlam of Australia
said that inﬂation-control methods based on demand management
didn’t “cater for this new situation” where “there was both unem-
ployment and inﬂation” (MES, January 6, 1977).
2.3 Unfavorable Sacriﬁce Ratios
Taylor (1997) suggests that 1970s policymakers understood that the
Phillips curve was vertical in the long run but believed that the
output-gap elasticity in the Phillips curve had diminished, so that
an unfavorable sacriﬁce ratio discouraged policymakers from disin-
ﬂating. According to this hypothesis, a disinﬂation via monetary
restraint was regarded as too costly, whereas the neglect hypothesis
instead says that policymakers believed that it was infeasible. As
close as these hypotheses are, the neglect hypothesis is preferable,
as it better rationalizes policymakers’ views on both the eﬀects of
monetary restriction and on their menu of policy options.
The sacriﬁce-ratio story does not rationalize policymakers’ actual
views on the eﬀects of monetary restriction because it attributes
to them the understanding that as monetary policy is made pro-
gressively tighter, inﬂationary pressure is reduced—that is, that
b2 in equation (1) is low but strictly positive. By contrast, 1970s
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policymakers often subscribed to the view that tightening worsens
inﬂation—either via an interest-cost-push channel or through a unit-
cost-push eﬀect (i.e., the positive eﬀect on unit costs of a reduction in
aggregate demand and thus output). We will see that this view was
inﬂuential in Canada in the lead-up to price controls in 1975 and was
prominent in New Zealand and Australian public debate until 1984
and 1985, respectively. From a monetary perspective on inﬂation,
this view is inappropriate because it emphasizes partial-equilibrium
eﬀects instead of the general-equilibrium eﬀect (i.e., the dependence
of total costs on excess demand). But from a pure cost-push per-
spective (i.e., b2 = 0 in equation [1]), the view can be rationalized
because the general-equilibrium eﬀect is absent.
The sacriﬁce-ratio story also does not rationalize policymakers’
accounts of their menu of choices during the Great Inﬂation. A low
b2 in the Phillips curve still leaves a continuous relationship between
aggregate demand control and inﬂation, and so standard messages
still hold: greater inﬂation control requires tighter monetary policy;
direct wage and price controls merely suppress the symptoms of in-
ﬂation. By contrast, policymakers in the Great Inﬂation felt that the
cost-push nature of inﬂation gave them a “free lunch” whereby suc-
cessful direct measures could eliminate the causes of inﬂation while
leaving them to stimulate aggregate demand to eliminate the output
gap. This free-lunch view not only guided policy during periods of
mandatory wage and price controls in these countries, but also under-
pinned policymakers’ support for wage/tax trade-oﬀs. For example,
New Zealand’s Prime Minister Muldoon said in 1981, “The most im-
portant single action to reduce inﬂation would be a wage/tax trade-
oﬀ” (EP, November 4, 1981), while Australian governments both in
late 1974 and early 1988 advanced wage/tax trade-oﬀs as means of
breaking inﬂation, even though they had undertaken major easings
of monetary policy. Because it posits the compatibility of monetary
expansion and inﬂation reduction, this free-lunch aspect of policy-
makers’ views is inconsistent with the sacriﬁce-ratio hypothesis, but
is consistent with the neglect hypothesis’s account of their views.8
8Note that the free-lunch view cannot be brought within the prism of the
standard monetary view of inﬂation by interpreting it as support for measures
to improve aggregate supply. Starting from a position of a negative output gap,
a successful supply-side measure reduces inﬂation but worsens the output gap
by adding to unused potential. Monetary expansion alongside the supply-side
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2.4 Output Gap Misperceptions
Orphanides (2003) attributes the Great Inﬂation to policymakers’
responses to estimates of the output gap that overestimated the
amount of slack in the economy. As ﬁgures 7–9 suggest, output gap
misperceptions were certainly part of the experience of the three
countries studied here. The hypothesis advanced in this paper in-
stead takes issue with the position that output gap mismeasurement
was the primary source of policy error. While Orphanides (2003)
argues that actual monetary policy in the 1970s had a modern
inﬂation-oriented outlook, the monetary policy neglect hypothesis
argues that policymakers had an incorrect (nonmonetary) model of
inﬂation, leading to an assignment of inﬂation control to nonmone-
tary devices. These conceptual errors were compounded by output
gap mismeasurement which, by giving the appearance that negative
gaps coexisted with high inﬂation, ratiﬁed the authorities’ adher-
ence to cost-push views of inﬂation. The discussion in sections 3–5
will identify speciﬁc episodes where misperceptions of the output
gap and policymakers’ cost-push inﬂation theories reinforced one
another.
2.5 The Nature of Inﬂation
Since the monetary policy neglect hypothesis rests on the contention
that the monetary view of inﬂation is valid, it is worthwhile to discuss
the implications of this view of inﬂation and its applicability to the
three countries studied here.
The above characterization of the monetary view of inﬂation as
corresponding to b2 > 0 with ut white noise means that price-level
shocks can shift current inﬂation even without monetary accommo-
dation, but cannot become entrenched in the expected inﬂation rate
in the absence of accommodation. No matter how exogenous the
shock to a speciﬁc price or wage, standard theory suggests that the
response of aggregate prices over time will be endogenous: a sud-
den price movement may initially jolt the aggregate inﬂation rate
improvement involves sacriﬁcing some of the improvement in inﬂation. In addi-
tion, the principal rationale for incomes policies (such as wage-price controls or
wage/tax trade-oﬀs) was that they directly removed cost-push pressures, not that
they increased potential output.
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upward, but prices cannot continue to rise at the new higher rate
if the monetary authority does not allow faster rates of growth of
aggregate demand. For example, the eﬀect of an oil shock on the
expected future inﬂation rate can be neutralized if the authorities
allow the path of real aggregate demand to match the new path of
potential output. This framework can also accommodate the open-
ness of the three economies studied here by treating imports as an
intermediate good and thus mattering for potential output in the
Phillips curve.
The wage-push view of inﬂation has sometimes been defended for
Australia and New Zealand on the grounds that independent gov-
ernment bodies (arbitration courts) determined minimum wages and
some aspects of the relative wage structure. This institutional feature
does not overturn the monetary view of inﬂation in principle, because
the courts’ decisions directly aﬀected current growth in a portion of
wages in the economy, while in the optimizing analysis underlying
(1), inﬂation depends on the whole expected path of marginal cost
(see Woodford 2003), which will be endogenous even if some period-t
cost increases are exogenous. Moreover, arbitration court decisions in
practice often ratiﬁed where market forces were pushing wages. For
example, the mandated increases in wages in 1973–74, often cited
as an exogenous event, occurred in the wake of a booming econ-
omy and extreme monetary expansion. Indeed, actual wage growth
in 1973–74 in Australia exceeded the mandated growth rates by wide
margins (Gruen, Pagan, and Thompson 1999, app. A). This period
therefore ﬁts into Bernanke’s (2004) description of a case where
“[s]eemingly unexplained or autonomous movements in wages and
prices. . .may in fact have been the result of earlier monetary policy
actions.”
With this background to the monetary policy neglect hypothesis
in mind, let us now consider in detail the record of each country
during the Great Inﬂation, starting with Canada.
3. Canada
Canadian monetary policymakers ended the 1960s with a disin-
ﬂationary strategy informed by several modern insights. Not only
did they subscribe to a conventional view of the inﬂationary pro-
cess, they recognized and explicitly endorsed the hypothesis that the
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long-run Phillips curve was vertical. Louis Rasminsky, the governor
of the Bank of Canada, did so in early 1969 when he described
the inﬂation/unemployment trade-oﬀ as “an illusion” because “peo-
ple. . . develop an expectation of continuing inﬂation and adjust their
behavior accordingly” (TGM, February 21, 1969). In addition, Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau himself stated in 1970 that it had “been
shown that this trade-oﬀ is a short-run phenomenon, and that sac-
riﬁcing price stability will not by itself aid in improving a country’s
long-run employment situation” (CPD, October 9, 1970, p. 33). The
latter statement was especially notable because it came from the ex-
ecutive branch of government which, in Canada as well as the two
other countries studied in this paper, had eﬀective control over mon-
etary policy throughout the 1970s.
By 1975, however, the Canadian authorities had moved from this
conventional position to an adherence to a nonmonetary view of in-
ﬂation, and imposed compulsory wage and price controls. The tran-
sition to this state of aﬀairs is due to two factors. First, a strong
body of opinion in Canada advocating cost-push positions existed
from the beginning of the 1970s. Second, errors in oﬃcial estimates
of the output gap led to estimated gap/inﬂation combinations that
were a challenge for the conventional theory of inﬂation to explain.
Both these factors grew in importance over the period of conven-
tional policy, 1969–71.
3.1 1969–71: Orthodox Beginnings
Over 1969 and 1970, the Canadian authorities gave primacy to aggre-
gate demand restraint in reducing inﬂation. Prime Minister Trudeau
indicated that “our policies to slow down the economy. . . will be
slackened when the inﬂationary psychology is broken in this country”
(CPD, April 17, 1970, p. 5984). Moreover, policymakers indicated
that they would not be perturbed if the period of monetary restric-
tion led to an interim period of simultaneous rising unemployment
and continuing high inﬂation. Governor Rasminsky said that it would
“not be too surprising, given the lags involved, if there is a tempo-
rary, rather discouraging period when we seem to be getting the
worst of both worlds” (FP, November 1, 1969).
Several outside commentators resorted instead to cost-push ex-
planations of Canada’s macroeconomic behavior, most persistently
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the Toronto Star newspaper, both on its editorial page and through
its economics columnist, Dian Cohen. Cohen’s view was that it was
“very hard to maintain that our current inﬂation is the result of ex-
cessive demand,” and that the lesson from the U.S. experience for
Canada was that monetary tightening “invariably resulted in mas-
sive unemployment without the desired price stabilization” (TST,
February 2, 1970). Restrictive monetary policy worsened inﬂation
in her analysis via the unit-cost-push eﬀect; ﬁscal tightening could
also be counterproductive because “as taxes go up so, ultimately,
do prices” (TST, December 14, 1970).9 Cohen combined these posi-
tions with interest-push and wage-push views to conclude that “the
chief sources of inﬂation are rising taxes, rising interest-rate costs,
rising wages and salaries—and even rising unemployment” (TST,
March 1, 1971) and that “economic policies that have traditionally
been thought to curb inﬂation actually aggravate and encourage it”
(TST, March 27, 1972). The Toronto Star editorials concurred that
Canada’s problem was “‘cost-push’ inﬂation [which] occurs when cor-
porations and organized labor take out more than they’re putting in”
(TST, August 21, 1971) and advocated a wage-price freeze followed
by a system of direct controls—which it called “the only weapon left
against inﬂation” (TST, February 10, 1972).
The government was initially in a good position to resist these
criticisms, as its restrictive policy brought inﬂation below 3 percent
by the end of 1970 without resort to controls. However, as ﬁgure
7 shows, the government overestimated the amount of slack it had
created in producing this favorable result. Consequently, it switched
to a considerably easier policy in 1970. Even in late 1971, the OECD
judged that “an expansionary economic policy still appears appro-
priate, given the existing amount of slack in the Canadian economy”
(WFP, December 28, 1971). In fact, however, the government had
already injected so much stimulus that inﬂation was on the way back
up.
9Similarly, Don McGillivray in the Financial Times of Canada wrote that the
“[e]vidence that taxes are a cause of inﬂation” was “piling up” (FTC, December
4, 1972), while Lubor Zink in the Toronto Sun asserted that “every increase in
tax rates is soon reﬂected in higher production costs and consumer prices” (TSN,
March 8, 1974).
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3.2 1972–74: Blaming International Factors
The resurgence of inﬂation in 1972 converted the Canadian author-
ities to cost-push analysis and nonmonetary remedies. They would
deny, in line with the output-gap estimates available at the time, that
Canada had an excess-demand problem. Instead, they would blame
international factors—what Prime Minister Trudeau called “world-
wide economic pressures largely beyond our control” (TSN, March
6, 1974)—for provoking inﬂation in Canada. According to this argu-
ment, the revival of inﬂation in Canada arose from its pressure on the
prices of world commodities, due to excess demand outside Canada.
Import-price inﬂation and cost-of-living adjustments of wages had
then driven up CPI inﬂation within Canada. The policy response
over 1972–74 consisted of actions to aﬀect speciﬁc prices, as well as
tax cuts. Monetary policy, on the other hand, was eased to ﬁght the
perceived unemployment problem.
Finance Minister Turner foreshadowed the government’s reliance
on commodity-price-push as the explanation for Canada’s inﬂation
when in early 1972 he noted that the country’s inﬂation performance
had recently deteriorated, but “this is partly attributable to special
factors relating to food” (CPD, February 24, 1972, p. 215). His di-
agnosis was similar two years later, when he contended that “the
sharp increase in oil prices plus the rise in commodity and food
prices constitutes the primary thrust of inﬂation in this country”
(CPD, January 7, 1974, p. 9100).
In September 1973, Turner listed the speciﬁc measures the gov-
ernment had taken against inﬂation: sales tax cuts, tariﬀ reductions,
and controls on the export of agricultural products (CPD, Septem-
ber 13, 1973, p. 6513). Similar measures were announced in his May
1974 budget. These actions were intended to oﬀset the eﬀects of
world inﬂation on the CPI, by reducing the extent of the commodity
price increase in Canada and by acting on the prices of other CPI
components.
The government’s acknowledgment of a contribution of develop-
ments within Canada to inﬂation was limited. Turner saw the prob-
lem as “a complicated interaction between world demand-pull inﬂa-
tionary forces and the reaction in Canada of cost-push forces,” such
as wage earners demanding compensation for price increases (CPD,
January 7, 1974, p. 9100). The authorities saw income tax cuts as
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the means of arresting spirals of this type, by increasing disposable
income without wage increases (CPD, February 19, 1973, p. 1435).
Prime Minister Trudeau also indicated that the government would
increase antitrust regulation to deal with “the cause of certain types
of cost-push inﬂation. . . [W]e’re dealing ﬁrst with the monopoly of
business because that is the more dangerous one” (TST, September
20, 1973).
To accompany these nonmonetary measures, Turner said that
“monetary policy. . . [will] continue to be expansionary” (CPD, April
10, 1973, p. 3132). In 1974, he rejected “deﬂation of demand by severe
measures of ﬁscal and monetary restraint” as a solution to inﬂation
(CPD, May 6, 1974, p. 2078) and instead described his strategy as
“breaking the inﬂationary spiral without impeding the continued
strong growth of production, employment and income” (TGM, June
8, 1974). Endorsing the unit-cost-push argument, he claimed that
restrictive demand policies abroad were worsening inﬂation because
they resulted in lower production (CPD, October 9, 1974, p. 260).
The evidence in ﬁgure 4 suggests that, contrary to beliefs at the
time, loose Canadian monetary policy was responsible for the re-
turn of inﬂation. As noted above, the easing had started with the
expansionary measures of 1970. Neither excess demand abroad nor
the rise in commodity prices actually provides grounds for believ-
ing that Canada could have sustained inﬂation without monetary
stimulus. Canada’s exchange rate had ﬂoated in 1970, providing the
conditions under which international shocks should impact relative
prices, but not the ongoing inﬂation rate, within Canada. The au-
thorities did not take advantage of those conditions. Instead, their
cost-push interpretation of inﬂation encouraged them to continue
monetary expansion.
3.3 1974–75: Drift to Controls
In late 1974 the government began to nominate wage-push as
the source of inﬂation. In his November budget speech, Turner
claimed that “the response to earlier international price increases
has provoked domestic forces of cost-push inﬂation in Canada”
(CPD, November 18, 1974, p. 1421). Mechanically, the govern-
ment’s changed diagnosis arose from the fact that commodity price
growth had receded, while double-digit CPI inﬂation continued.
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Inﬂation—according to the cost-push view—thus became “domestic”
in character. A more standard analysis, however, would dispute that
inﬂation’s character had changed—rather, excessive demand condi-
tions remained the problem throughout. These conditions account
for why high inﬂation continued even after commodity price pres-
sures eased.
The government responded by arranging talks on a voluntary
incomes policy (CPD, November 18, 1974, p. 1423). Following the
collapse of these talks in May 1975, Prime Minister Trudeau said
that the change in the character of inﬂation from international to
wage-push meant that the case against compulsory wage and price
controls had weakened (TST, May 23, 1975). On October 13, 1975,
Trudeau announced a three-year control program.
3.4 1975–78: Monetary Policy in the Controls Period
In conjunction with the imposition of the controls, Finance Minis-
ter Macdonald announced that the Bank of Canada would pursue
targets for M1 growth, on the grounds that it was “essential for
the success of any prices and incomes policy to avoid too rapid a
rate of growth of demand and the development of excess pressure on
resources” (TGM, October 15, 1975). The stage, therefore, seemed
set for a restrictive monetary policy to accompany price controls,
thus providing a counterexample to the generalization that periods
of control are accompanied by monetary ease.
In practice, however, such a counterexample did not emerge:
while policy did tighten over 1976, nominal interest rates fell and
currency growth picked up during 1977. The M1 targets were met
throughout, but hitting these targets did not restrain other mea-
sures of money growth or require increases in nominal interest rates,
because households reduced their M1 holdings relative to other de-
posit categories. Consistent with the easing, inﬂation revived over
1978–81.
Much of the easing was conscious and reﬂected the lingering in-
ﬂuence of cost-push views—i.e., that Canada’s inﬂation was of a
nonmonetary character and that, therefore, the case for restraining
aggregate demand was not compelling. In 1976, Finance Minister
Macdonald reaﬃrmed the government’s nonmonetary diagnosis of
inﬂation, stating: “It is frequently argued that. . . excessive increases
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in the money supply have been the major cause of inﬂation in
Canada. . . But I do not believe they are the primary cause of the
inﬂation we have experienced in this country” (TGM, August 19,
1976).
Indeed, as they watched inﬂation fall during the controls period,
policymakers appear to have had too much conﬁdence that the de-
cline represented the genuine removal of inﬂationary pressure. Just
eight months into the controls, Bank of Canada Governor Bouey
stated that it was “within the realm of possibility that receding in-
ﬂation will permit a gradual moderation of money supply growth
without the need for signiﬁcantly higher interest rates than we have
at present,” and that “in an atmosphere of growing conﬁdence that
inﬂation was being brought under control. . . interest rates could over
time be expected to begin declining” (TGM, June 24, 1976). This
message would have been unexceptional during a period of no price
controls. But in a period where an observed decline in inﬂation was
virtually inevitable because of the controls, the message would have
helped encourage expectations of interest-rate cuts to accompany the
decline. By early 1977, the Bank of Canada had indeed cut short-
term nominal interest rates down to levels below those prevailing at
the start of price controls.
In addition, the post-1973 slowdown in potential growth had be-
come a new source of output-gap mismeasurement. Contemporary
observers of the Canadian economy initially mistook much of this
slowdown as reﬂecting weakness in demand—a misconception paral-
leling the U.S. situation, studied by Orphanides (2003). As ﬁgure 7
shows, the OECD’s 1977 estimates of Canada’s output gap were far
more negative than now seem appropriate.10 Subscribers to a mon-
etary view of inﬂation, such as Laidler (1978), questioned these gap
estimates on the grounds that they were inconsistent with Canada’s
severe inﬂation. Cost-push adherents, on the other hand, felt that
severely negative output gaps and high inﬂation were compatible.
While cost-push views do appear to have discouraged the au-
thorities from implementing a suﬃciently tight monetary policy over
1975–78, such views did lead to a genuine disinﬂation beginning in
10As late as March 1977, a Canadian ﬁnancial columnist described 5 percent
as “Canada’s long-term average rate of real growth,” and characterized the Bank
of Canada’s monetary targets as guided by that rate (FTC, March 14, 1977).
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1978. Just as in the United States in the same year (see Nelson
2004, sec. 5), a fear based on a cost-push scenario—a wage-price spi-
ral triggered by exchange-rate depreciation—triggered a monetary
tightening. The deputy governor of the Bank of Canada explained
that the bank in 1978 was “raising domestic interest rates repeat-
edly” out of concern that “the direct impact on Canada’s price level
of further substantial exchange [rate] depreciation could. . . set oﬀ a
renewed outbreak of serious wage inﬂation” (Freeman 1981, 200).
Trudeau himself claimed in October 1978 that “inﬂation is coming
in from outside, very simply because of the high cost of things we im-
port, and very simply because of the lowered value of the [Canadian]
dollar” (CPD, October 12, 1978, p. 33). Finance Minister Chre´tien
blamed the revival of inﬂation on “the rise in food prices and the
fall in the dollar” and endorsed the fear that these would trigger
“a fresh outbreak of large, leap-frogging wage and price increases”
(CPD, November 16, 1978, p. 1200).
According to an orthodox (monetary) view of inﬂation, this
import-price-push view was invalid—depreciation could not trigger
a new inﬂation spiral unless the depreciation was itself a symptom of
excessive demand created by the government. Despite its misguided
character, however, the import-price-push view was important, both
in Canada and the United States, in shifting monetary policymakers
to a tighter position in late 1978. The tighter policy eventually pro-
duced dividends in lower inﬂation: four-quarter CPI inﬂation peaked
in Canada in mid-1981 and fell below 5 percent by the end of 1983.
4. Australia
Australia never had compulsory price controls of the type imposed in
Canada, but in other respects was more immersed in a nonmonetary
tradition of inﬂation control that lingered until the 1990s.
4.1 1971–72: Blaming Wage-Push
In the fourth quarter of 1970, annualized CPI inﬂation was 7.7 per-
cent and the four-quarter rate reached 4.9 percent; both were the
highest rates in Australia since the mid-1950s. The inﬂation break-
out occurred during the term of oﬃce of the government headed
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by Liberal Party leader John Gorton.11 In response, Prime Minister
Gorton gave a televised address to the nation on January 29, 1971,
in which he blamed inﬂation on wage-push. Gorton ruled out “taking
monetary and ﬁscal measures at this time,” stating that his govern-
ment did not “believe the present situation requires a lift in interest
rates, already high” (SMH, January 30, 1971). Three weeks later,
Gorton reaﬃrmed that “the real problem. . . is cost-push inﬂation,”
and maintained that the “biggest single inﬂuence now which can pre-
vent inﬂation is a conscious and ﬁrm eﬀort on the part of wage-ﬁxing
tribunals” (APD, February 18, 1971, p. 314). The cabinet minister
with responsibility for labor market issues, B. M. Snedden, main-
tained that “excess demand does not presently exist” and agreed
that the “answer to the present problems is that there should be
more restraints on wages” (APD, February 18, 1971, pp. 307, 308).12
For some months in late 1971, the government (now led by
William McMahon) did pursue measures to rein in demand. This
did not represent an abandonment of its wage-push diagnosis, but
instead reﬂected a fear that wage increases could lead to demand
pressure. Inﬂation did fall in 1972, but in the meantime, the appar-
ent failure of inﬂation to respond to demand restriction validated
the government’s earlier diagnosis of autonomous wage-push. Prime
Minister McMahon denied responsibility: “It is obvious that the rise
in the consumer price index is due mainly to cost increases brought
about by very large wage increases. It is plainly absurd for the Leader
of the Opposition to attribute the rise to the Government” (DM,
October 22, 1971).
The severity of the government’s demand restriction was overes-
timated by observers, with the Institute of Applied Economic and
Social Research claiming: “At no other time during the past eight
years has there been such a high percentage of idle capacity” (TA,
11In Australia, the principal conservative party is known as the Liberal Party,
with the Australian Labor Party its main electoral opponent. In the period stud-
ied here, the Liberal Party headed a government until December 1972, and was
followed by Labor for two terms (1972–75). The Liberals then headed a govern-
ment for three terms from 1975 to 1983, after which Labor served four terms over
1983–96.
12Snedden had also put on record the government’s support for the view—
an important part of the cost-push position—that demand did not exert upward
pressure on prices until full employment was reached (Department of Labour and
National Service 1970, 17).
Vol. 1 No. 1 Monetary Policy Neglect 155
December 29, 1971). Arguments that demand stimulus would reduce
inﬂation became prevalent, with business columnist Warren Beeby
judging that “[i]n the present economic climate, a reduction in in-
terest rates is more likely to act against inﬂation than feed it. It
would relax some of the cost pressures, stimulate demand, and get
industry moving again. . . ” (SA, September 19, 1971). A commer-
cial bank advised: “Greater spending would stimulate an expansion
of production [and] reduce unit costs. . . ” (TA, November 20, 1971).
Over 1972 the government eased monetary policy and, late in its
term, was still being described as “leaning heavily on the argument
that wage increases cause inﬂation” (TA, August 3, 1972).
4.2 1972–73: Monetary Tightening and Push for Controls
Despite its cost-push explanation of 1972’s inﬂation, the Treasury
was aware that the undervalued dollar and accompanying rapid
money growth meant the prospect of excessive demand in 1973.
In light of these concerns, the Labor government of Gough Whit-
lam, elected in December 1972, revalued the Australian dollar and
introduced foreign exchange controls, both of which worked in the
direction of reducing money growth. To this extent, the government
was now taking conventional monetary measures against inﬂation.
A submission to cabinet by the Assistant Treasurer in October 1973
reveals, however, that the authorities’ views remained unorthodox in
important respects (ACR, October 5, 1973). This document classiﬁed
inﬂation, which was now moving into double digits, as falling into
three categories: imported inﬂation, which it characterized as work-
ing not only through the eﬀect of balance-of-payments surpluses on
the money supply, but also “through rising import prices; cost in-
ﬂation; and demand inﬂation, occurring when “demand. . . run[s] be-
yond the capacity of supply.” This classiﬁcation scheme amounted
to a cost-push approach to inﬂation, supplemented by an acknowl-
edgment that the output gap matters for inﬂation when the gap is
positive. By contrast, a monetary view of inﬂation would not cate-
gorize cost and imported inﬂation as distinct from demand inﬂation,
but as simply routes through which excessive demand is transmitted
to the inﬂation rate.
The government’s classiﬁcation of inﬂation into three distinct
types is also reﬂected in the three main actions it took as
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anti-inﬂationary policy in the second half of 1973: tariﬀ cuts; a mon-
etary tightening; and proposed wage and price controls.
The government announced a 25 percent tariﬀ cut in July 1973
with the statement: “The justiﬁcation for the general reduction of
tariﬀs is the excessive rate of inﬂation which now prevails. . . The
tariﬀ changes will have a direct impact on import prices of about
the same magnitude as an Australian revaluation of slightly less
than 6%” (TA, July 19, 1973). This equivalence rests on the ob-
servation that both actions withdraw import-price-push pressure on
prices. But from a monetary view of inﬂation, revaluation and tariﬀ
cuts are not equivalent. Revaluation drains aggregate demand and
reduces pressure on prices by creating a balance-of-payments deteri-
oration and thereby producing monetary contraction. A tariﬀ cut, by
contrast, need have no such eﬀects. Prime Minister Whitlam would
adhere to the import-price-push view well after he left oﬃce, main-
taining in a 1977 television interview that “the biggest component
of inﬂation at the moment in Australia is Australia’s excessive pro-
tectionism” (MC, September 19, 1977).
Action was taken to reduce money growth with a 5 percent reval-
uation in September 1973, accompanied by an announcement by
the Prime Minister of “a sharp rise [about 2 percent]... in inter-
est yields. . . an essential precondition if inﬂation is to be countered
at all” (SMH, September 10, 1973). The reference to monetary re-
straint as a “precondition” for inﬂation control again left open the
possibility that some inﬂation was of a nonmonetary variety.
The third measure against inﬂation by the government during
1973 was an eﬀort to introduce compulsory wage and price controls.
Since it lacked the constitutional powers to impose wage and price
controls, the government held a referendum in December 1973 to
obtain those powers. The referendum proposals were defeated on
December 8, 1973.
4.3 1974–75: Abandoning Monetary Solutions
As of late 1973, the Australian authorities were pursuing a largely
orthodox economic package—employing monetary restriction rather
than price controls—against inﬂation. That policy would eventu-
ally produce dividends in the form of falling inﬂation in mid-1975.
By then, however, the government had become disillusioned with
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monetary restraint as a cure for inﬂation and had embraced a non-
monetary approach.
This shift was largely a response to 1974’s stagﬂation. While
the strict monetary policy of 1973–74 did cut deeply into aggregate
demand, it happened to coincide with a shift to a lower path of
potential output, due to permanent shifts in the labor market and
the post-1973 productivity slowdown. The government incorrectly
perceived a severely negative output gap. It was not until June 1975
that Treasurer Cairns publicly acknowledged that “the minimum
level of unemployment will be considerably higher than in the past
decade” (TA, June 5, 1975), while the slowdown in potential growth
took years to recognize. With aggregate supply actually falling nearly
as much as aggregate demand, the fall in inﬂation was not only
delayed but modest. The apparent emergence of prolonged inﬂation
alongside a deep output gap led Prime Minister Whitlam himself to
adopt a strict cost-push diagnosis of inﬂation. “I have to be quite
frank with you,” he said in a televised address to the nation, invoking
import-price-push, “inﬂation will not be wholly beaten until there
is a worldwide solution” (DT, August 27, 1974). In October 1974
he placed emphasis on wage-push as the source of inﬂation: “There
should be no doubt that this severe inﬂation will continue if there
are excessive wage claims” (TA, October 22, 1974).
A mini-budget delivered by Whitlam in November 1974 outlined
the government’s change in strategy. He now rejected aggregate de-
mand limitation as an essential ingredient in inﬂation control, in-
stead claiming “[w]hat is needed is a stimulus to the economy which
increases demand, whilst at the same time abating cost pressures”
(APD, November 12, 1974, p. 3360). To this end, he had approved
“a very substantial relaxation of monetary policy,” while his state-
ment announced cuts in personal income taxes. He argued that the
tax cut would both stimulate demand and serve as a direct “attack
on inﬂation, by reducing wage pressures” (APD, November 12, 1974,
p. 3361), since disposable incomes could now rise without wage in-
creases. The government was therefore pursuing a voluntary incomes
policy based on a wage/tax-push view of inﬂation.
Not only did the government no longer view demand restraint as
an essential part of an anti-inﬂation program, it now contended that
monetary restriction actually promoted inﬂation. Treasurer Cairns
said that tight monetary policy in 1974 had made unemployment
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and inﬂation worse because it had been introduced when excess de-
mand was ceasing to be a problem (TA, June 5, 1975), an argument
he based on interest-cost-push and unit-cost-push views of inﬂation
(MEH, September 23, 1975).
4.4 1976–79: Sending Mixed Signals
The Liberal government that took oﬃce in late 1975 ostensibly ac-
cepted an important role for monetary policy in the control of in-
ﬂation, with steps to reduce money growth announced in January
1976 and targets for growth in M3 commenced in March 1976. In
practice, however, inﬂation in the double-digit range was a prob-
lem for the whole life of the government. The government made
little progress in reducing inﬂation after its ﬁrst two years in of-
ﬁce, and with the lag between monetary policy actions and inﬂation,
the initial reduction is best attributed to the reining in of money
growth that occurred in 1973–74 under Whitlam. It was not until
1980 that the government’s monetary policy became more genuinely
anti-inﬂationary, and—again due to lags—this did not deliver a sub-
stantial fall in inﬂation until after the government lost oﬃce in 1983.
In part, the government’s failure to achieve a major monetary
tightening earlier than 1980 is attributable to its ﬂawed execution
of monetary targeting. In contrast to Whitlam’s tightening in 1973,
open market sales and increases in short-term interest rates were typ-
ically eschewed in favor of heavy use of reserve-requirement changes.
Indeed, the January 1976 package of measures to reduce money
growth was accompanied by an announced reduction in oﬃcial short-
term rates (AFR, January 23, 1976). The reliance on quantitative
controls is reﬂected in the fact that the compulsory cash-reserve re-
quirement was changed eighteen times over 1976–79. Such actions
should not have been regarded as eﬀective, because with an un-
changed policy rate, a higher reserve requirement leads to the extra
monetary base being created by the central bank, with no downward
pressure on deposit growth or aggregate demand. An additional error
was that the authorities falsely believed that budget deﬁcit reduc-
tions made an automatic contribution to restricting money growth.
Indeed, The Economist characterized the government’s strategy in
1978 as using deﬁcit control to reduce money growth “without a rise
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in interest rates” (TE, August 19, 1978)—this at a time when real
interest rates were close to zero.
The government sent further mixed signals on inﬂation control
because its adoption of monetary targeting was by no means ac-
companied by abandonment of the cost-push analysis of inﬂation.
Both Prime Minister Fraser and Treasurer Lynch believed that wage-
tribunal decisions could add directly to inﬂation, with Fraser saying
they contributed to “this vicious spiral of higher prices, higher money
wages, higher costs, and yet more price increases” (DT, February 14,
1976) and Lynch arguing that “excessive wage and salary claims re-
main a direct impetus to more inﬂation” (DM, February 20, 1976). In
fact, the government unsuccessfully attempted in April-May 1977 to
arrange a wage-price freeze, a measure Fraser claimed would “break
the back of inﬂation” (TE, April 16, 1977).
This shows that the government’s misguided means of pursuing
monetary targets were not just a technical error—they were founded
in the cost-push approach. Low real interest rates should have sig-
naled to the government that it had not actually tightened monetary
policy substantially. But the above statements show that the author-
ities believed that wage-price spirals could occur without monetary
accommodation, and that a price freeze could break inﬂationary ex-
pectations. They could therefore attribute low real interest rates to
autonomous movements in expected inﬂation, to be remedied by di-
rect intervention in wage and price setting rather than by higher
nominal interest rates.
As ﬁgure 8 indicates, another impediment to tighter policy was a
still erroneous picture about the state of demand. In October 1977,
The Economist expressed the widespread view that “the Australian
economy is operating at well below capacity” (TE, October 29, 1977),
an assessment that reﬂected the continued failure to recognize the
post-1973 slowdown in potential GDP.
4.5 1980–82: Moving to a Stricter Rule
Around 1980, the Australian authorities do appear to have shifted to
a more genuinely anti-inﬂationary stance. The real ex-post Treasury
bill rate was 2.4 percent in the ﬁrst ten quarters of the 1980s, higher
than in any ten-quarter period since 1962–64; furthermore, discrep-
ancies between actual interest rates and Taylor rule prescriptions
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became less striking (ﬁgure 5). It therefore appears appropriate to
characterize policy from 1980 as the adoption of a more restrictive
interest-rate rule. This change may have been a response to criti-
cism in public debate of quantitative controls and calls for a more
market-oriented monetary policy (see Guttmann 2004). The tighter
policy also probably reﬂected the recognition that Australia’s slower
growth after 1973 was supply-side in character. The more inﬂation-
oriented monetary policy helped deliver better inﬂation performance
after 1982. This improvement was marred by two major revivals, in
1985–86 and 1988–90. Both occasions of higher inﬂation reﬂect lapses
by the authorities back into nonmonetary strategies against inﬂation.
4.6 1982–84: Lapse into Monetary Policy Neglect
The early 1980s monetary tightening in Australia was initially felt
only in recession, while wage and price inﬂation increased, reﬂecting
delayed responses to past monetary ease. By late 1982, the Fraser
government had reverted to a more stimulative policy on aggregate
demand, and in October 1982, with four-quarter CPI inﬂation having
reached 12.3 percent, Prime Minister Fraser announced his support
for a six-month wage freeze (DM, October 26, 1982). The claimed
rationale for such a freeze was that it would simultaneously reduce
inﬂation and unemployment, and when the government formally ad-
vanced the plan, it estimated that the freeze would reduce inﬂation
by six percentage points (AFR, December 17, 1982). The wage freeze
was agreed to by the state governments and wage tribunals, and be-
came eﬀective in December 1982. Thus, at the end of 1982, Australia
was pursuing a stricter incomes policy than it ever had in the 1970s.
The Hawke government that came into oﬃce in March 1983 even-
tually brought inﬂation below 5 percent, though not until 1991.
In the intervening years, it deployed a number of nonmonetary
strategies against inﬂation and experienced the usual disappoint-
ments with these approaches. The centerpiece of these nonmone-
tary tools was the “Accord,” an agreement on wage growth between
the government and labor unions. Early in the government’s term,
Treasurer Keating indicated that this incomes policy would not be
used as a substitute for aggregate demand policies against inﬂation;
this, however, proved a short-lived position (Kelly 1992, 66), and
Keating was reported in September 1983 as believing that Australia’s
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wage-ﬁxation system made inﬂation diﬃcult to control via demand
weapons (DM, September 8, 1983). The government also continued
an expansionary monetary policy and reaﬃrmed its view of incomes
policy as a weapon that could help reduce the reliance on demand
management. In August 1983, Prime Minister Hawke made it clear
that he saw incomes policy as an alternative to the “traditional in-
struments of tighter monetary and ﬁscal policy to restrain inﬂation”
(TA, September 1, 1983).
In January 1985, the government faced a decision on whether
to tighten monetary policy after growth in the M3 aggregate
persistently exceeded the target rate. It was widely accepted that
M3 behavior reﬂected distortions from ﬁnancial innovation, but
other monetary aggregates less subject to distortion also suggested
easy money conditions, while real interest rates—though well
above 1970s values—had been slightly below U.S. levels during
most of 1984, even as Australia had more serious inﬂation. The
government’s decision to drop the monetary target, and not tighten
monetary policy at all, was applauded by the Sydney Morning
Herald in an editorial: “[M]onetary policy is anything but loose.
Any further tightening of monetary policy. . . would be more likely to
fuel inﬂation than control it. . . [because with] the Accord, the Gov-
ernment has promised to deliver employment and economic growth”
(SMH, January 30, 1985). Thus, three years after monetary policy
had produced disinﬂation in major economies, the argument that
monetary tightening worsened inﬂation was still being prominently
advanced in Australian policy debate.
4.7 1985–91: Discarding the Nonmonetary Framework
The position that monetary policy was already tight, and that fur-
ther tightening would relaunch inﬂation, was not borne out by devel-
opments in the rest of 1985. Faced with a resurgence of inﬂation, the
government tightened monetary policy beginning in February 1985.
The fact that monetary policy was tightened when inﬂation rose,
despite the continuing prevalence of cost-push views among poli-
cymakers, reﬂects the import-price push diagnosis of the inﬂation
outbreak. Even from a cost-push perspective, monetary tightening
is the appropriate response to rising inﬂation if the rise is believed
to have come from exchange-rate depreciation.
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In contrast to the fears expressed earlier in 1985, monetary tight-
ening did not produce a wage-price spiral. Price inﬂation receded
in 1987–88, reﬂecting a delayed reaction to the 1985–86 tightening,
while wage inﬂation was lower still, in part reﬂecting continuing at-
tempts to use control of wages as an anti-inﬂationary weapon. To
this end, the government negotiated over 1985–86 a trade-oﬀ be-
tween nominal wage increases and tax cuts.
Contrary to their aim, the 1980s incomes policies in Australia ap-
pear to have contributed little or nothing to the control of inﬂation.
Price inﬂation in the 1980s behaved dissimilarly to wage inﬂation;
as one of Keating’s subsequent advisers observed, incomes policy ap-
peared “extremely successful in restraining the growth of wages but
not of inﬂation” (Edwards 1996, 282). Policymakers attributed this
failure ﬁrst to import-price-push and then to proﬁt-push. In fact,
however, it appears that it was the absence of monetary restraint
that really made the diﬀerence, as price inﬂation in the 1980s re-
sponded quite predictably to prior monetary developments.13
Monetary policy setting in the 1980s was made more compli-
cated by the global rise in real interest rates. But by the mid-1980s
the experience of disinﬂating countries should have made it clear to
the Australian authorities that the average real rate consistent with
price stability was higher than in, say, the 1960s. Overconﬁdence in
incomes policy, not uncertainty about real rates, explains why Trea-
surer Keating predicted in May 1988 that “inﬂation [is] now heading
towards 5 percent or lower” (APD, May 25, 1988, p. 3013), despite
nominal interest rates having been cut by 6 percentage points (and
real rates by around 3 points) over the course of 1987.
Satisﬁed that inﬂation control had been successfully delegated
to other devices, the authorities thus permitted monetary ease over
1987–88, an easing reﬂected in a surge in inﬂation over 1988–90.
In addition, 1988 brought a new series of nonmonetary initiatives
against inﬂation. Many of them were introduced in the August
13For the period of strictest wage control, 1983–89, the correlation of CPI in-
ﬂation and growth in average nominal wages is −0.22; the maximum positive
correlation of inﬂation with prior wage growth is 0.42 (inﬂation and wage growth
one year earlier). By contrast, the maximum correlation of inﬂation and money
(currency) growth is 0.61 (inﬂation and money growth two years earlier). An-
other measure of monetary ease—the excess of the Taylor rule prescriptions in
ﬁgure 5 over actual short rates—leads inﬂation over 1983–89 by one year, with a
correlation of 0.85.
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1988 budget, as a newspaper report recorded: “The Budget’s anti-
inﬂationary strategy hinges on lower indirect taxes, mainly for beer
drinkers, and a delay in personal tax cuts. . . [T]he size of the [income
tax] cuts will depend on the second wage/tax trade-oﬀ. . . ” (TA,
August 24, 1988). Reﬂecting on these measures, Treasurer Keating
remarked, “Having succeeded in bringing down the inﬂation rate of
11 per cent under the Liberal Party to 5 per cent in 1985, and having
watched inﬂation rise to 10 per cent as a result of a big depreciation
of the exchange rate, we are now succeeding in bringing it back to
the 5 per cent area whence it came in 1985... Inﬂation is declining”
(APD, November 30, 1988, p. 3547). But inﬂation actually rose from
its 1988 Q1 trough of 6.9 percent, ending the 1980s at a four-quarter
rate of 7.8 percent.
A major monetary policy tightening also occurred in 1988. The
tightening itself was motivated by balance-of-payments rather than
inﬂation considerations. The fall in inﬂation that it produced, how-
ever, transformed the views of policymakers and observers about
the role of monetary policy in inﬂation control. As late as 1990, the
governor of the Reserve Bank rejected central-bank inﬂation tar-
geting as infeasible in Australia, and cited the need for other tools
such as wages policy (AFR, October 18, 1990). When inﬂation fell
below 5 percent in early 1991—clearly a response to the period of
monetary restraint—Treasurer Keating spoke publicly about low in-
ﬂation as the criterion by which macroeconomic policy should be
judged (Edwards 1996, 405). Gruen and Stevens (2000, 52) record
that in the 1990s, “the main insight of two centuries of monetary eco-
nomics. . . that monetary policy ultimately determined inﬂation” con-
vinced the authorities that nonmonetary approaches to inﬂation con-
trol should be abandoned in favor of central-bank inﬂation targeting.
5. New Zealand
In the 1970s and 1980s, decisions on monetary policy were the re-
sponsibility of the New Zealand Treasury, headed by the Minister of
Finance. In May 1970, Finance Minister Robert Muldoon rejected
private estimates that inﬂation in New Zealand, which stood above
4 percent, might reach 9 percent later in the year. Muldoon noted
that New Zealand’s experience was of lower inﬂation than in Japan,
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom (EP, May 6,
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1970). Building on this comparison, Muldoon said that “countries
which fail to hold inﬂation will suﬀer in comparison with those which
are successful. This is the test. . . ” (EP, July 21, 1970). Over the
following ﬁfteen years, during which Muldoon totaled eleven more
years as Finance Minister, New Zealand performed poorly by this
test. In 1985, New Zealand’s CPI averaged 5.7 times its 1970 value,
compared to 2.7 in Japan, 2.8 in the United States, 3.1 in Canada,
4.1 in Australia, and 5.0 in the United Kingdom. The deterioration
reﬂected repeated application by the authorities of the policy com-
bination associated with monetary policy neglect—direct wage-price
controls accompanied by monetary expansion.
5.1 1970–72: Rival Spiral Theories
The government had predicted in mid-1970 that inﬂation for the full
year would be a little over 4 percent (EP, May 29, 1970). By the end
of 1970, four-quarter CPI inﬂation was instead moving into double
digits. Muldoon cited “a wage/price spiral caused. . . by the stronger
and more militant unions” (NZPD, June 25, 1970, p. 1298), while
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand similarly judged that “[t]he ‘cost-
push’ type of inﬂation now seems to be dominant” (RBNZ, April
1970). The government imposed a three-month wage-price freeze in
November 1970 and negotiated with unions for a voluntary wages
policy to follow the freeze. After the negotiations failed, the gov-
ernment introduced a compulsory policy accompanied by continued
monitoring of prices.
The opposition, headed by Labour Party leader Norman Kirk,
had its own cost-push diagnosis of inﬂation. Kirk rejected the wage-
push explanation on the grounds that “wages and salaries were in-
creased because costs and prices had increased” (NZPD, June 15,
1971, p. 853). Instead he blamed a “cost-tax-price spiral” initiated by
government tax increases (NZPD, June 15, 1971, p. 854). The govern-
ment and opposition thus had rival “spiral” theories of inﬂation—a
wage-price spiral versus a cost-tax-price spiral—neither of them con-
sistent with a monetary explanation.
Kirk also endorsed the unit-cost-push argument that demand re-
striction worsened inﬂation: “Stagnation is a cause of inﬂation. . . [by]
compelling factories to run at less than full capacity so that the
unit cost remains high but the volume of output falls. . . If we want
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to cure inﬂation, we must ﬁrst increase production” (NZPD, June
14, 1972, pp. 116–17). Even the premise of Kirk’s argument—
that demand was weak in 1972—has no support in revised data
(ﬁgure 9).
By 1972, however, the government shared Kirk’s view that the
output gap had gone negative. This perceived deterioration had
occurred alongside continued double-digit inﬂation through most
of 1971, so the government’s cost-push diagnosis was reinforced.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand claimed that in “a period of
‘stagﬂation’. . . orthodox monetary policy is of subsidiary impor-
tance” (RBNZ, April 1972). Similarly, Muldoon claimed that recent
overseas attempts to ﬁght inﬂation with monetary restriction had
raised unemployment without reducing inﬂation (NZPD, June 10,
1971, p. 785).
In light of these judgments, the government in March 1972 in-
creased its range of direct controls—imposing stricter controls over
ﬁrms’ price decisions, freezes on prices of government output, and
limits on dividend income (NZPD, June 22, 1972, pp. 391–92).
The government also undertook monetary and ﬁscal expansion. In
line with the cost-push view, it believed that pressure on inﬂation
from demand only began once the economy reached potential, which
Muldoon said was far oﬀ, given the “unused capacity in the econ-
omy” (NZPD, June 22, 1972, p. 409).
The timing of Muldoon’s policy loosening was far from appropri-
ate as, like Australia, New Zealand had entered a period of tremen-
dous increases in the monetary base due to large inﬂows of foreign
capital and export earnings. Muldoon’s monetary easing was a re-
sponse to the more restrained pre-1972 demand environment, which
the external developments had already replaced with boom condi-
tions. The earlier period of weaker demand, as well as the controls
imposed by the government, nevertheless secured a fall of inﬂation
to just above 5 percent by the end of 1972.
5.2 1972–75: Labour Government
The National Party administration was defeated at the election of
November 1972 and was succeeded by a Labour government led by
Norman Kirk. The government was immediately faced with a revival
of inﬂation, which in the ﬁrst quarter of 1973 returned to double-digit
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annualized rates. The authorities took a strict cost-push interpreta-
tion of the increase. Presenting the government’s 1973 budget, Fi-
nance Minister Rowling acknowledged that “inﬂation has become the
number one problem” (NZPD, June 14, 1973, p. 1353), but insisted
that “short-term economic management must keep the economy run-
ning close to full capacity” (p. 1349). To this end, the government
actually cut the Treasury bill rate by 50 basis points to 2 percent
in May 1973 (RBNZ, April 1974). The measures Rowling outlined
to “contain the inﬂationary pressures which are apparent” (NZPD,
June 14, 1973, p. 1349) consisted of interventions in the markets for
particular goods.
Prime Minister Kirk returned from an overseas visit in August
1973 claiming inﬂation was a mystery: “So far, nobody has been
able to say what is causing inﬂation, let alone suggest a remedy for
it” (EP, August 16, 1973). His own account of New Zealand’s inﬂa-
tion was that “living costs have risen because of the price of meat”
(NZPD, September 1, 1973, p. 3422). In addition, he blamed import-
price-push: “we are also feeling the eﬀect of inﬂation in the Northern
Hemisphere through a sharp and very severe rise in the prices of our
imports.” The import-price-push analysis would produce the main
monetary tightening of the year—the exchange-rate revaluation in
September 1973.
New Zealand’s announcement of a 10 percent revaluation was
synchronized with the revaluation taking place in Australia. How-
ever, in contrast to the statement by Prime Minister Whitlam in
Australia, which had mentioned the need to curb money growth,
Kirk’s rationale for the revaluation concentrated on the import-
price-reducing aspects of the action. “The increasing cost of im-
ports and the higher prices of meat and other goods which we ex-
port have been major causes of the rising cost of living in New
Zealand. . . A major threat to cost and price stability that we face
now is the surge of inﬂation reaching New Zealand from abroad,”
he told a press conference. He argued that the revaluation would
be anti-inﬂationary via “a reduction. . . in the cost of imported goods
and of those export commodities whose prices tend to be determined
in overseas markets. . . [with] further beneﬁts as these price eﬀects
work their way through the national cost structure” (CP, Septem-
ber 10, 1973). Other than a brief reference to the strength of New
Zealand’s overseas reserves, the implications of the revaluation for
Vol. 1 No. 1 Monetary Policy Neglect 167
monetary and aggregate demand conditions went unmentioned by
Kirk, even though, from the perspective of a monetary view of inﬂa-
tion, these were the most important aspects of the policy action.
Consistent with the government’s rejection of excess demand as a
source of inﬂation, Kirk’s revaluation announcement was not accom-
panied by interest-rate increases; rather, the accompanying measures
were a range of new controls on the prices and export of agricul-
tural goods (NZH, September 10, 1973). The four-quarter rate of
CPI inﬂation ended 1973 at 10 percent, nearly double its value a
year earlier. Finance Minister Rowling attributed the increase in the
inﬂation rate during 1973 to “three major factors: meat prices, gov-
erned by overseas realizations; fruit and vegetable prices, governed
by the weather in this country; and import prices, governed by other
people’s costs. None of these things comes very directly within the
control of the Government” (NZPD, June 5, 1974, p. 1642).
Later in 1974, the authorities turned to blaming domestic wage-
push for inﬂation. The government (now led by Rowling after Kirk’s
death) introduced new controls on wage growth and in 1975 ne-
gotiated wage agreements with labor unions (RBNZ, April 1975).
Finance Minister Tizard claimed that “an eﬀective incomes policy is
crucial in the current economic situation. . . a relaxation of controls
on wage bargaining is directly dependent on a moderation of our
present inﬂation” (NZPD, May 22, 1975, p. 1295). Prime Minister
Rowling rejected demand contraction on the grounds that it had
been tried overseas and had caused unemployment with little eﬀect
on inﬂation. Instead, he described his task as to “ensure that there
is the least possible disruption to sustained economic growth and
employment” (EP, December 3, 1974).
5.3 1976–79: Misleading Austerity
Following the November 1975 election, the National Party returned
to oﬃce, now led by Robert Muldoon who, in addition to becoming
Prime Minister, resumed his former position of Finance Minister.
Throughout his term in oﬃce, Muldoon maintained cost-push views
of inﬂation. He nevertheless consciously pursued a policy of zero real
GDP growth in 1976; the rationale for this strategy was to improve
the current account balance rather than inﬂation (CP, January 13,
1982). The government announced a tightening in March 1976, with
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a 100 basis point increase in Treasury bill rates to 4 percent (RBNZ,
April 1976). With inﬂation at over 15 percent, this still implied highly
negative real rates. Real rates were nevertheless less negative than
they had been in 1975, and this, along with the slowdown of money
growth that had occurred after 1973, produced somewhat more re-
strained monetary conditions in the mid-1970s than had prevailed
earlier in the decade.
A slowdown in the economy did occur over 1976–77, and this
slowdown, in turn, accounts for the decline in inﬂation to around 10
percent in late 1978. The reason why inﬂation did not fall further
is that in terms of excess demand, the measures to restrict demand
were nowhere as austere as thought at the time, because potential
output growth had undergone a particularly severe slowdown (ta-
ble 1). As in other countries, the authorities were slow to recognize
the reduced growth of supply; and, again as in other countries, in
the meantime they observed protracted periods of high inﬂation and
negative gaps, seemingly conﬁrming cost-push views of inﬂation. It
was not until 1978 that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand made it
clear that “New Zealand’s slow growth reﬂects fundamental struc-
tural factors” (RBNZ, April 1978).
Growing recognition of the productivity slowdown had no ef-
fect on the Muldoon government’s adherence to nonmonetary views
on inﬂation. Muldoon imposed a four-month freeze on prices in
late 1976; when inﬂation continued after the freeze’s removal, he
claimed, “Two main factors are maintaining the present inﬂation-
ary momentum. These are import prices and wages” (NZPD, July
21, 1977, p. 1525). Giving little role to monetary policy in his anti-
inﬂation strategy, Muldoon allowed policy to ease during 1978, and
by the end of the 1970s, inﬂation was close to its 1970s peak of
17 percent.
5.4 1980–84: Reaﬃrming Nonmonetary Approaches
In January 1980, while several major economies were assigning a cen-
tral role to monetary policy in ﬁghting inﬂation, the Muldoon govern-
ment continued to adhere to the view that inﬂation was largely be-
yond the reach of macroeconomic policy. “New Zealand is, of course,
still vulnerable to overseas inﬂuences, particularly oil prices, and
to domestic factors, such as wage increases,” Muldoon said. “What
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happens to prices over the coming year will be determined largely by
these two factors” (CP, January 14, 1980). Shortly afterward, four-
quarter CPI inﬂation reached a peacetime peak of over 18 percent, a
rate which Muldoon claimed was “almost entirely” due to the second
oil shock (AST, October 2, 1981).
The wage-push diagnosis of inﬂation led the Muldoon government
to attempt to negotiate a wage/tax trade-oﬀ with trade unions over
1981–82.14 When these negotiations broke down, Muldoon imposed
a one-year wage-price freeze. Muldoon’s justiﬁcation for the freeze
cited developments in major OECD countries. “Rates of inﬂation in
most of these countries are declining. . . These countries are major
suppliers of products to New Zealand. . . The price of oil is expected
to decline in real terms throughout the remainder of this year. . . All
of these things give us a unique opportunity to reduce New Zealand’s
rate of inﬂation. . . ” (NZH, June 23, 1982).
The political reaction to the controls announcement was a wa-
tershed, reﬂecting the increased role since 1980 for conventional eco-
nomic analysis in New Zealand debate. Opposition leader Rowling
gave an orthodox critique of Muldoon’s freeze:
“The wages and prices freeze will not work. . . After all, in
the year A.D. 301, a little before the Minister of Finance’s
time, but not before the policies adopted by the present
Government—that dates the policies—the Emperor Dio-
cletian introduced a price freeze with the death penalty
for non-compliance, and it still did not work. There is
no way in which it will work in 1982, any more than it
[c]ould in A.D. 301, because such a proposition resolves
absolutely nothing.” (NZPD, July 20, 1982, p. 1199).
Similarly, Rowling’s successor as Labour Party leader, David
Lange, said that New Zealand’s trading partners had reduced in-
ﬂation by tightening monetary policy, while Muldoon’s government
had undertaken no such attack on the causes of inﬂation (CP, July
11, 1983).
14The Reserve Bank governor also voiced support for an incomes policy, stating:
“I don’t believe inﬂation, which is well-entrenched and is being encouraged by the
close linkage between costs and prices, can be overcome solely by tight monetary
and ﬁscal policies” (NZH, February 13, 1982).
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For his part, Muldoon in his 1983 budget claimed that “monetary
restraint” had accompanied the wage-price freeze (NZPD, July 28,
1983, p. 891). In fact, however, the government followed an expan-
sionary policy. Muldoon made it clear that he had no intention of
reining in demand during the freeze: “I would think that we should be
able to keep the general level of economic activity high enough that
there should be no big increase in unemployment” (CP, December
28, 1982). In July 1983, Muldoon reduced the interest rate on three-
month Treasury bills from 12 percent to 7.8 percent (AST, July 30,
1983). His rationale made it clear that his concept of “monetary re-
straint” involved making real rates positive by suppressing inﬂation,
not by increasing nominal rates: with inﬂation down to 4 percent,
he said, an 8 percent nominal return was “pretty reasonable” (EP,
October 13, 1983).
The evolution of macroeconomic policies during the freeze thus
conﬁrmed a fear expressed by Don Brash, later head of the cen-
tral bank, but in 1982 a newspaper columnist. At the time of the
freeze’s imposition, Brash worried that the worst side eﬀect of the
freeze would be that it would “fool people into believing that some-
thing is actually being achieved in the reduction of inﬂation,” at
the same time that the government did nothing to reduce monetary
growth (AST, June 23, 1982). The appearance of success proceeded
as the four-quarter CPI inﬂation rate fell into single digits in mid-
1983, troughing at 3.5 percent at the end of the year, by which time
the freeze had been extended to February 1984. A member of Mul-
doon’s cabinet, Foreign Aﬀairs Minister Cooper, declared victory:
the government, he said, was the ﬁrst in the history of Western civ-
ilization to have cured inﬂation successfully via a wage-price freeze
(CP, September 17, 1983).
The illusory nature of this improvement was revealed in July
1984, when CPI data for the ﬁrst post-freeze quarter revealed that
prices had jumped by 2.2 percent (CP, July 10, 1984). Shortly after-
wards, the Muldoon government suﬀered electoral defeat.
5.5 1984–90: From Price Controls to Inﬂation Targets
Immediately upon taking oﬃce, the Labour government tightened
monetary policy. Short-term interest rates increased sharply and in
1985 took positive real values for the ﬁrst time (excluding the freeze
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period) since 1969. Finance Minister Douglas justiﬁed the interest-
rate increases on the grounds that they would “assist in keeping
both inﬂationary pressure and inﬂationary expectations down” (CP,
August 3, 1984), a contrary judgment to that of defeated Prime
Minister Muldoon, who deplored the changes on interest-cost-push
grounds (CP, July 19, 1984). Given the lagged response of inﬂation
to monetary policy actions, the monetary policy tightening begun in
1984 did not prevent higher inﬂation over 1985−87—a rise reﬂecting
the earlier period of monetary ease, the removal of remaining price
controls, and the impact eﬀect of higher indirect taxation. Inﬂation
did, however, fall into single digits at the end of 1987, and the four-
quarter rate fell below 5 percent at the end of 1988. Also in 1988, the
government appointed Don Brash as governor of the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand. Brash’s view of the record of controls was negative:
“Literally hundreds of governments, of all political persuasions and in
all parts of the world, have tried to reduce inﬂation by direct controls.
There is no case where controls alone succeeded” (AST, June 23,
1982).15 Over 1989−90 the authorities cemented the delegation of
inﬂation control in New Zealand to monetary policy through their
much-discussed launch of inﬂation targeting (see, e.g., Debelle 1996,
60–62; Bernanke et al. 1999, chap. 5).
6. Conclusion
The analysis in this paper indicates that the course of macroeco-
nomic policy during the Great Inﬂation in Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand shared four common features.
First, policymakers (at least from 1971) viewed inﬂation as re-
sulting from factors beyond their control, not as a consequence of
their monetary policy decisions. This rules out explanations of the
Great Inﬂation that characterize the monetary authority as con-
sciously choosing the inﬂation rate to achieve certain outcomes for
real variables, or as part of an optimization exercise. Such explana-
tions include those used in the time-consistency literature and also
accounts that rely on a government belief in a permanent trade-oﬀ
between unemployment and inﬂation. The record of policymakers’
15Similarly, Brash judged that other nonmonetary devices such as wage/tax
trade-oﬀs had “a negligible impact on inﬂation” (AST, June 17, 1982).
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views is, however, consistent with the monetary policy neglect hy-
pothesis.
Second, nonmonetary actions against inﬂation were accompanied
by monetary expansion, not restraint. Occasionally policymakers
verbally acknowledged the need for monetary restriction to com-
plement incomes policies, but in practice they did not follow such a
combination. In particular, while recognizing that real interest rates
had become abnormally low, they felt that positive real rates could
be restored by direct actions against the expected-inﬂation compo-
nent of nominal rates. On other occasions, they were quite explicit
that they intended to stimulate or maintain aggregate demand while
delegating inﬂation control to other devices.
Third, output-gap mismeasurement reinforced the tendency for
monetary policy neglect. The belief that inﬂation behavior was pro-
ceeding in spite of negative output gaps motivated the shift to non-
monetary theories of inﬂation; and once nonmonetary devices against
inﬂation had been deployed, the desire to eliminate output gaps jus-
tiﬁed monetary expansion.
Fourth, the monetary policy regime change that produced disin-
ﬂation did not always coincide with a rejection of the nonmonetary
view of the inﬂation process. In New Zealand, the adoption of ﬁrmer
monetary policies did coincide with the election of a government that
took a monetary view of inﬂation. In Australia and Canada, the mon-
etary changes were triggered either by cost-push considerations (i.e.,
fear of exchange rate depreciation in Canada) or factors besides in-
ﬂation (i.e., balance-of-payments considerations in Australia). The
disinﬂations that followed, however, converted policymakers in these
countries to a monetary view of inﬂation, an important step toward
their adoption of an inﬂation-targeting framework.
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